House Intelligence Committee releases its Benghazi report

 The House Intelligence Committee has released its final report on the investigation into the Benghazi scandal.

  Here are the major findings from the investigation:

1. There is no evidence of an intelligence failure. Prior to the Benghazi attacks, the CIA provided sufficient strategic warning of the deteriorating threat environment to U.S. decision-makers, including those at the State Department. 
2. CIA provided sufficient security personnel, resources, and equipment to defend against the known terrorist threat and to enable CIA operations in Benghazi.
3. State Department security personnel, resources, and equipment were unable to counter the terrorist threat that day, and they required CIA assistance.
4. The CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria.
5. A mixed group including members of al-Qa’ida in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), the Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN), Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS), and Abu Abaydah Ibn Jarah Battalion (UJB) participated in the attacks, along with Qadafi loyalists.
6. Appropriate personnel on the ground in Benghazi made the decision to send CIA officers to rescue the State Department officers at the TMF.
7. Although some security officers voiced a greater urgency to depart for the TMF, no officer at CIA was ever told to stand down.
8. The decision to send CIA officers from Tripoli to Benghazi to rescue the Ambassador and bolster security of the U.S. personnel in Benghazi was a tactical decision appropriately made by the senior officers on the ground.
9. The Tripoli team’s decision not to move to the hospital to retrieve Ambassador Stevens was based on the best intelligence at the time.
10. The CIA received all military support that was available. Neither the CIA nor DOD denied requests for air support. One CIA security officer requested a Spectre gunship that he believed was available, but his commanding officer did not relay the request because he correctly knew the gunship was not available.
11. Ambassador Rice’s September 16 public statements about the existence of a protest, as well as some of the underlying intelligence reports, turned out to be inaccurate.
12. Deputy CIA Director Michael Morell made significant changes to the talking points.
13. CIA’s Office of Public Affairs also made substantive changes to the talking points by removing the reference to “ties to al-Qa’ida” in the second bullet of the original draft.
14. Overall, the CIA could have placed more weight on eyewitness sources on the ground and should have challenged its initial assessments about the existence of a protest earlier.
15. CIA did not intimidate or prevent any officer from speaking to Congress or otherwise telling his story.
16. There is no evidence that the CIA conducted any unusual polygraph exams related to Benghazi.
17. While at times the agencies were slow to respond, ultimately the CIA, NCTC, FBI and other Executive Branch agencies fully cooperated with the Committee’s investigation.

  It would seem to me that, with the exception of points 11,12, and 13 this investigation is for all intents and purposes over. The aforementioned points deal with what I believe was a consorted effort by Susan Rice and the Obama regime to downplay the role al-Qaeda played in the attack in order to protect Barack Obama because at the time he was running for reelection on the notion that al-Qaeda was on the run and this ran counter to his claim. I do not believe this was a mistake.

  Will the Congress look into this possibility? I highly doubt it and at this point I say, with all seriousness, what difference does it make?